On Nov. 18, 2026, K3 Capital’s sBOLD vault on Ethereum and Reental’s Polygon platform were each hacked, together draining roughly $3.88 million.

On Nov. 18, 2026, K3 Capital’s sBOLD vault on Ethereum and Reental’s Polygon platform were each hacked, together draining roughly $3.88 million.

Two decentralized‑finance services suffered a combined loss of about $3.88 million on 18 November 2026 after separate attacks on smart contracts operating on Ethereum and Polygon, according to alerts issued by blockchain‑security firm Blockaid. The firm highlighted the breach of K3 Capital’s sBOLD vault and the draining of funds from the Reental platform in a series of posts on X, noting that both incidents were still unfolding when they were disclosed, Crypto.news reported.

Blockaid explained that the K3 Capital exploit centered on a yield‑producing vault that is linked to Liquity V2, a borrowing system that mints the $BOLD stablecoin against ETH collateral. The attackers obtained flash loans in wrapped staked ether (wstETH), used those loans to distort the liquidation mechanism, and then purchased sBOLD shares at prices far below their intrinsic value. The firm described the attack as a process of creating cheap sBOLD tokens, swapping the underlying collateral, and redeeming other users’ $BOLD. Blockaid also posted the Ethereum address associated with the attack, a supporting address, and an example transaction hash.

According to Liquity’s documentation, sBOLD is a third‑party offering managed by K3 Capital rather than by Liquity’s core developers. Depositors hand over $BOLD in exchange for sBOLD tokens, while the vault reinvests earnings from Liquity V2’s stability pools. Crypto.news said it reached out to K3 Capital for comment but had not heard back at the time of publication.

Earlier reviews of the vault’s code had flagged a related risk. In a May 19 2025 audit, ChainSecurity identified a high‑severity accounting bug that could cause an older version of the software to undervalue sBOLD shares after liquidations, potentially allowing an attacker to extract funds belonging to other users. The audit noted that the issue had been remedied by adjusting the valuation formula to incorporate collateral, thereby mitigating the possibility of value extraction through self‑liquidations. That review listed two critical, three high‑severity and eight medium‑severity findings, all marked as fixed. A separate May 2025 assessment by Dedaub examined the vault’s dependence on $BOLD market liquidity and its capacity to price the stablecoin accurately.

It remains unclear whether the November 18 attack leveraged the previously discovered accounting flaw or a different vulnerability.

The second breach involved Reental, a platform that tokenises real‑estate assets on Polygon. Blockaid reported that an administrator upgraded the proxy contracts governing the platform’s USDT and USDC deposit tokens—known as aTokens—to a version that permitted anyone to withdraw the underlying stablecoins. After the upgrade, the remaining balances were swept out. At the time the alert was posted, roughly $454 000 had been moved in two transactions. Blockaid provided one address linked to the exploit and identified the two compromised contracts. Reental’s public materials describe tokenised loans and property‑linked shares in Spain and the United States.

Both incidents illustrate how periods of market stress that drive yield‑seeking users toward vaults and tokenised products also expand the attack surface for malicious actors. Vault architectures that rely on third‑party collateral accounting are especially vulnerable: a single pricing error can affect every depositor simultaneously. Reental’s case, by contrast, stemmed from an administrative contract upgrade rather than sophisticated market manipulation.

These events occur against a backdrop of renewed competition among DeFi lending protocols for idle bank deposits, which has funneled more capital into on‑chain yield products in recent months. For retail participants, the practical takeaway is that audits can highlight hazards but do not eliminate them; users should verify who actually runs a vault, not merely which protocol it interfaces with, before committing funds.

Open questions remain about how much of the roughly $3.88 million can be traced or recovered and whether either platform will confirm the precise cause of the breach. Greater clarity on the sBOLD issue would also help determine whether other vaults built on Liquity V2 require remediation. Meanwhile, a Curve Finance governance proposal to replace its vulnerable fee‑conversion contract is set to close on 20 November.

Source: CryptoNews.net

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